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Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE!
This is an appeal from a Judgment, Order and Modification of Decree granted on the 5th day of May, 197 6, by the
Honorable Bryant H. Croft on Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause
and Defendant's Petition to Modify Divorce Decree.

Both par-

ties in person and by counsel, were sworn and each testified
and presented documentary evidence in support of his or her
position.
This action was originally commenced by the filing, on
December 14, 1972, of a Complaint by Plaintiff-Respondent,
ANITA DUMESNIL CUMMINGS, against Defenant-^Appellant, PATRICK
C. CUMMINGS, seeking a Decree of Divorce, control and custody
of the three minor children subject to reasonable visitation

privileges in the Defendant-Appellant, the family home and
automobile, along with division of assets accumulated by the
parties, attorneys1 fees, as well as alimony and child support.
Defendant-Appellant answered and counterclaimed for
a Decree of Divorce and other relief in an answer and counterclaim filed January 5, 1973; the first of multiple supplementary proceedings was heard on an Order to Show Cause before
the Honorable Marcellus K, Snow on the 7th of May, 1973.
There Defendant-Appellant was ordered to provide certain temporary support, assume certain liability, and the framework of
visitation was there first established by court order.

Mar-

riage counseling occurred by the Family Court Division, and it
was the recommendation of the Family Court Commissioner that
the divorce proceedings be allowed to proceed.

Trial was held

on the 19th day of December, 1973, before the Honorable G. Hal
Taylor.

Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

made and entered by the trial court, it was decreed that Plaintiff-Respondent would be granted a Decree of Divorce from
Defendant-Appellant on the ground of mental cruelty; that custody of the three minor children, subject to reasonable visitation, be granted Plaintiff-Respondent; that Defendant-Appellant be ordered to pay Plaintiff-Respondent the sum of $125.00
per month for the benefit of each minor child and $200.00 per
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month alimony; that the family home be Plaintiff-Respondent's
sole property; and that Plaintiff-Respondent be granted certain other relief as against Defendant-Appellant.
Plaintiff then moved for a new trial and for amendment
of judgment in the motion filed January 23, 1974, said motion
heard before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor on the 31st day of
January, 1974.

Judge Taylor at that hearing granted Plain-

tiff's motion for new trial on the issues of division of property and alimony.

Plaintiff-Respondent and Defendant-Appellant

entered into a stipulation as between the parties dividing the
property, defining the custody and rights of visitation, agreeing to child support of $375.00 on the facts that then existed,
and agreeing to alimony in the sum of $285.00 per month, terminating on Plaintiff's remarriage or death.

Pursuant to the

stipulation of counsel, the original Decree of Divorce entered
on the 15th day of January, 1974, was modified by Amended
Decree of Divorce entered the 26th day of June, 1974.
Defendant-Appellant then caused to be issued an Order
to Show Cause why Plaintiff-Respondent should not be held in
contempt for selling and disposing of iteitis of personal property and refusing to deliver other property awarded to him pursuant to the Amended Decree of Divorce; said Order to Show
Cause was heard by the trial court on the 12th day of November,
1974, and the parties were ordered to comply with the Amended
Decree of Divorce.
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Plaintiff-Respondent then moved for an Order to Show
Cause why Defendant-Appellant should not be adjudged guilty
of contempt for wilfully disregarding the Amended Decree of
Divorce.

Defendant-Appellant then responded with a verified

petition for modification of decree and Order to Show Cause.
The motions of the parties were consolidated and heard before
the Honorable Bryant H. Croft on the 5th day of May, 197 6.
The order arising from that hearing is the subject of this
appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's order
and judgment with respect to the issue of alimony.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were married on the 30th day of June, 1962,
in the State of California and were married approximately 12
years.

There were three children born of said marriage, Pat-

rick, Jr., presently age 13, Paul, presently age 8, and Mark,
presently age 7, who now reside with Plaintiff-Respondent.
Since the Decree of Divorce, each party has established a separate life, both entering into a long-term relationship with a
member of the opposite sex, Defendant-Appellant

having been

remarried.
Defendant-Appellant, until the present year had con-
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tinued in the restaurant business.

Plaintiff-Respondent was

unemployed for a substantial period of time, but has now taken
part-time employment.

There exists as between the parties con-

siderable animosity and it is reasonable to believe that but
for the shared relationship of the parties with their children
and the financial responsibility of Defendant-Appellant that
each would have severed totally their relationship.
This matter has been adjudicated at length, and the
court below has attempted to resolve by legal means a conflict
that is essentially personal except as to the legal issues of
support and visitation.
Plaintiff-Respondent and Defendant-Appellant are both
in their mid-thirties and are of normal mental and physical
health.
DISPOSITION IN LOITER COURT
The order of the court entered the 3rd day of June,
1976, includes the following provisions:
(1)

Judgment for Plaintiff-Respondent In the sum of

$735.00 for accrued alimony for the months of March and April,
1976.
(2)

An order that future payments be made through the

Family Support Division of the court on the 1st and 16th of
each.month in the sum of $330.00 for each half month.
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(3)

Setting a time certain for visitation on alter-

nate weekends as certain conditions for their return on Sunday.
(4)

Modification of the Decree allowing two weeks

visitation during the summer to be taken in one continuous period or for two separate periods of one week each.
(5)

That each party should bear their own attorneys1

fees and costs.
This appeal is solely concerned with the order for
alimony of $285.00 per month and takes no exceptions to the
order of the court by the Honorable Bryant H. Croft on the 13th
day of May, 1976.
ARGUMENT
For purposes of this appeal only the matter of alimony
is brought before the Court for review.

Appellant here concedes

that the sum of $125.00 per month per minor child is not so excessive as to constitute an abuse of discretion for the continuance of said sum in the order of the trial court.

That on the

same economic background, the issues of child support and alimony are severable, is a matter of recent law (Dehm v. Dehm,
545 P.2d 525 at 526/197$]).
SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY SUPPORTING APPELLANT'S CONTENTIONS
It is the contention of Appellant that his income has
and continues to vary widely from year to year.
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Further, it is

contended by Appellant that his net economic position, apart
from cash flow, has been in decline since the Amended Decree
of Divorce.

Appellant believes this contention is supported

by testimony and the United States and Utah individual income
tax returns for the years 1973, 1974 and 1975.

For example,

his adjusted gross income was $20,602.50 (R-106, 1. 15), his
total Federal tax on income was $4,897.44

(R-106, 1. 22), his

Utah State tax was $658.84 (R-110, 1. 17) in 1973, leaving Appellant a net income for that year of $15,705.06.
In 1974 Appellant had an adjusted gross income of
$27,046.00 (R-97, 1. 15). His total tax liability to the Federal Government was $4,403.00 (R-97, 1. 221), his Utah tax liability was $656.00 (R-105, 1. 19), for an after-tax income of
$21,987.00.
Whereas in 1975 Appellant had an adjusted gross income
of $18,987.00 (R-87, 1. 15) with a Federal tax liability of
$818.00 (R-87, 1. 20) and a Utah income tajc of $169.00 (R-96,
1. 19), for a net income of $18,000.00, a variation of several
thousand dollars occurred from year to year.

One figure re-

mained constant, however, that was his support obligation accruing at the rate of $660.00 per month, ah annual liability of
$7,920.00.
In the above-mentioned years Appellant, with greater
or lesser difficulty, could bear the order and support obliga-
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tion.

In 1976, however, certain events occurred that substan-

tially reduced the monthly adjusted income of Appellant.

June's

Cafe began losing money and was sold (R-124, 11. 12-30).

A

certain management contract referred to as the Freeway Insurance Bank Contract terminated.

Said contract had brough Appel-

lant a gross income of $500-$600 per month (R-124, 11. 2-11).
Appellant's monthly salary dropped to approximately $775.00
(R-125, 11. 1-9). The sale of June's Cafe with a payment of
$25,000 was reduced by dispersals and obligations to the sum of
$5,855.00.

Appellant was awarded, as his sole and separate

property, in the Amended Decree of Divorce, the equity in his
then existing businesses.

A predominant proportion of the pro-

ceeds of the sale of June's Cafe should be characterized as return of capital and is so recognized by both the United States
Government and the State of Utah in their tax laws.
A PORTION OF THE INCOME DERIVED FROM THE OPERATION
OF JUNE'S CAFE SHOULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE WORK OF
APPELLANT'S WIFE.
The form W-2 of June's Cafe for the taxable year 1975
indicates an income from wages, tips and other compensation of
$1,500.00 (R-87, attachment).

Appellant testified, and it was

uncontroverted that his present wife was employed on the average
of 30 hours per week in the operation of June's Cafe.

This an-

nual rate of salary is a gross monthly income of $125.00.
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It

can be reasonably interpreted from the testimony that Appellant's
present wife contributed a substantial part to the gross income
of the business by working for such a nominal wage.

This is sup-

ported by testimony of Appellant (R-128, 11, 10-30); (R-129, 11.
1-2).

This testimony is in contrast with the uncontradicted tes-

timony of Appellant that Respondent, during the course of their
marriage, never worked (R-30, 11. 13-16).

Respondent testified

that even after the divorce she worked only sporadically or
part-time employment despite what she characterized as substantial needs above and beyond the sum paid to her by Appellant
(R-147, 1. 11.).

!

It was the position of the trial court that a third
party had not duty of support of minors with whom he might have
social relationships (R-151, 11. 12-15)•

It can be just as rea-

sonably held that Appellant's second wife has no duty of support
of her husband's minor children.

If the income generated by

June's Cafe is properly attributed, in part, to the efforts of
Appellant's wife, the Court, sitting in equity, should allow for
this factor.
DECLINE IN EQUITY OF ASSETS AWARDED APPELLANT OVER
TIME.
The assets now held by Appellant are in substantial
part traceable to those assets awarded Appellant in the amended
Decree of Divorce.

For example, the proceeds of the Cross Roads

-9-

Restaurant, a sum of approximately $40,000, was eventually
transmuted into the real estate contract now being paid Appellant for the sale of June's Cafe (R-144, 11. 9-17).

The pro-

ceeds of the Hub Five also ultimately were absorbed into the
net equity of Appellant in June's Cafe (R-144, 1. 27-R-145, 1.3).
Appellant has moved into a home with a purchase price
less than one-half of that of his previous home (R-136, 11. 2430; R-137, 11. 16-21).

Appellant further testified that he made

no profit from the sale of his former home and faced a possible
loss pending litigation (R-143, 11. 10-21).
Appellant testified that his present motor vehicle had
an out-of-pocket cost of $2,600.00, the remainder of the value
having been provided by the equity in a truck previously awarded
in the divorce decree as his sole and separate property (R-140,
11. 19-24), said vehicle having been used in his trade or business.
RELATIVE ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCE OF RESPONDENT.
Respondent testified that she was not employed at the
time of the divorce (R-147, 11. 1-14), and had not been employedi
except for a brief period at Christmas time in 1974 until taking her present position in June, 1975 (R-147,
20).

1. 25-R-148, 1.

She further testified that he expenses had not substanti-

ally changed between the time of the divorce and the present
(R-148,

1. 21-R-149, 1. 16), and that her wage had been recent-
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ly increased (R-151,

1. 20-R-152, 1. 4).

Respondent testified that she had no physical or mental problems that would prevent her from working full time
(R-149, 11. 25-30).

Respondent testified that the hour that

she returned home after working part-time was 6:00,6:30 or 7:00
p.m., a time later than most full-time daytime positions would
require.

She further testified that all her children were in

school (R-150, 11. 18-19).

It may therefore be argued that the

undertaking of a full-time job would take no more time away
from Respondent's children than now happens, but rather an earlier time for returning home might well occur.

Respondent tes-

tified that the children are now alone until she returns from
work (R-152,

1. 22-R-153, 1. 7).

On redirect, Respondent testified that she had made no
effort to improve her skills or obtain additional education or
in other ways become more productive (R-153, 11. 21-30).
I
THE TRIAL COURT HAS A DUTY TO EXAMINE THE TOTALITY
OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF BOTH PARTIES AND DETERMINE
THE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY THAT WOULD BE EQUITABLE TO
BOTH PARTIES.
Speaking on the issue of modification of a decree of
alimony, "...the courts upon the application of either party
have the power to change, modify, or revise such a decree, and
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whenever it is satisfactorily made to appear that the circumstances and conditions of the parties, or one of them, have
changed so that the amount originally allowed is no longer just
or equitable, the court may modify the same" (Buzzo v. Buzzo,
45 Utah 625, 148 P. 362 at 36311915}).

The changes that occur

subsequent to a decree of divorce are those of the general human condition.

Former husbands and former wives do economically

better or worse, and it has been theposition of the courts over
time that these changes should be recognized.
"Again, suppose that a husband at the time a divorce
is granted has ample means, and the court makes a liberal allowance to the wife as alimony....

Further, that in such case

the husband, after the decree is entered, and after the time
for appeal has elapsed suffers financial reverses and loses the
most, if not all, of his property or he is injured physically,
or loses his health, and the allowance is no longer just and
equitable; why should not the court, upon such a statement of
facts being shown, modify the decree by decreasing or setting
aside the allowance theretofore made" (Cody v. Cody, 47 Utah
456, 154 P. 952 at 955 £l916j) .

The standard for modification

remains as it has been historically that which is "reasonable
and prudent" (Flannery v. Flannery, 536 P. 2d 136 at 138 £l975l).
This Court has viewed the overall impact of courtordered division of property and support upon both the husband
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and wife for some time:
The object to be desired is to minimize
animosities and to" let the dead past bury its
dead" insofar as that is possible. The Court's
responsibility is to endeavor to provide a just
and equitable adjustment of their economic resources so that the parties can jreconstruct their
lives on a happy and useful basi[s. In doing so
it is necessary for the Court td consider, in addition to the relative guilt or innocence of the
parties, an appraisal of all the attendant-facts
and circumstances: the duration of the marriage;
the age of the parties; their scjcial positions and
standards of living; their health; considerations
relative to children, the money and property they
possess and how it was acquired; their capabilities
and training and their present ajnd potential incomes
(Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 at
979 C1956J).
II
THAT AT THE TIME OF THE DIVORCE pECREE TWO OF
THREE CHILDREN HAD NOT YET STARTED SCHOOL, AND
IT WAS ENVISIONED BY THE PARTIES IN THEIR STIPULATED AGREEMENT THAT PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT WOULD
NEED SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO BE ABLE TO BE HOME WITH
THE CHILDREN.

SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE CHANGED.

At the time of the divorce Plaintfiff-Respondent, except for a brief interval of temporary work, had not been employed during the course of their marriage.

After the decree,

Plaintiff-Respondent did not work before alll the children began
attending school.

At the present, Plaintiflf-Respondent works

part-time in a position that requires later hours than the
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usual full-time employment.
In prior decisions this Court has placed emphasis
on the contemplation of the parties and the trial court of
the wife having or beginning employment at the time of the
divorce decree

in upholding

the lower court's refusal to

later modify the decree to reduce alimony (Short v. Short, 25
Utah 2d 326, 481 P.2d 54 at 55 Cl97lJ ; Allen v. Allen, 25
Utah 2d 87, 475 P.2d 1021 at 1022 £1970}).
case here.

Such is not the

At the time of the divorce decree Plaintiff-Respon-

dent had virtually no work history and had two pre-school age
children in her custody.
would not work.

It was then contemplated that she

Years progressed, and Plaintiff-Respondent has

taken employment.

Each of her sons attends school during the

day, and she, despite inflation, finds her overall dollar need
no higher at the time of the motion for modification than at
the time of the divorce.

Felt v. Felt, 27 Utah 2d 103, 493

P.2d 620 at 623 (1972).
That Plaintiff-Respondent is able to maintain the
payments on a then new automobile is indicative of a lack of
hardship and change of circumstance that should have been considered by the court below.

Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d

1359 at 1360 (1974).
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Ill
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW BEING THAT THE TRIAL COURT
HAS CONSIDERABLE DISCRETION DOES NOT EXTEND TO THE
DEGREE THAT IF A MANIFEST INJUSTICE OR INEQUITY APPEARS FROM THE RECORD THAT THE LOWER COURT MAY NOT
BE REVERSED FOR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
"In any event, solutions of these domestic problems
are difficult and largely not capable of g. satisfactory solution
either to the judge, or the parties.

The court is often com-

pelled to use every ingenuity in order to stimulate human nature
l

to do its duty or its utmost toward fulfillment of that duty.
This Court does not have those problems to meet.

But in a num-

ber of cases, we have taken upon ourselves to modify decrees in
ways which were insubstantial as compared to what is asked in
this case"

(Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 265 at 268

Cl937-3) . There the court reversed on the facts and remanded
the case to the lower court.
The importance of the trial tran$cript, as it might
indicate the accuracy of factual determinating is indicated in
a recent decision of this Court, Mitchell v. Mitchell, supra.
In the instant case it is the uncontradicted testimony of Defendant-Appellant that a substantial change in his economic life
had occurred in 197 6 and that the conditions that existed in
1973, 1974 and 1975 no longer existed.

It would be improper for

the trial judge to speculate as to the futuire earnings of Appel-
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lant when th only testimony on the record as to DefendantAppellant1 s present earning capacity showed a substantial decline in salary and net worth.
Although limited by some more recent cases, and the
need for judicial finality in domestic relations cases, the
holding in Hendricks v. Hendricks, 91 Utah 553, 63 P.2d 277 at
279 (1936), that this Court has the power to modify alimony on
a sufficient showing of facts is today undisturbed:
if upon examination of the record, this Court

"...that

is convinced

that the award in the trial court is inequitable and unjust, it
should direct such decree as it finds to be just and equitable."
In a more recent case this Court held:

"We remain

aware of the prerogatives and broad discretion accorded the
trial court in matters of divorce and supplemental proceedings
therein.

Nevertheless, this certainly does not extend to an ar-

bitrary and unreasoning power to disregard this proceeding being in equity, this Court may review questions of both law and
fact the very purpose of which is to rectify errors where the
evidence does not support the findings or where it clearly preponderates against them"

(King v. King, 478 P.2d 492 at 495,

496 C1970J).
Again in family matters:

"This is an equitable mat-

ter, and upon appeal the binding effect of the findings made by
the trial court differs from that in a laiw matter.

We may here

review questions of both law and fact; and after making due al-16-

lowance for the advantaged position of th$ trial judge to observe the demeanor of witnesses upon the $tand, we may be persuaded that a finding is against the preponderance of evidence
to such an extent that we would be justified in disapproving
it or even making a finding of our own"

^Wiese v. Wiese, 24

Utah 2d 236, 469 P.2d 504 at 505 C1970J),
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that the lower court
erred in ordering continuation of the alimony provisions of the
Amended Decree of Divorce unchanged and that that order should
be reversed upon its merits.

Appellant
225 South 200 East #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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